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the Extraits of Lucretius, nor is it listed as a separate 
publication in the bibliography.4
 Bergson’s work on Lucretius has not completely 
disappeared from view; for example, it has been 
noted in the recent Cambridge Companion to 
Lucretius,5 but no extensive analysis exists. It is 
effectively seen as an exercise in pedagogic assist-
ance for young students in Bergson’s care, and a 
kind of preparatory work for what is taken to be a 
later, more significant development. Bergson’s 
actual starting point is not seen by many contem-
porary scholars as his true beginning. My intention 
in this paper is simply to draw attention to this rich 
and neglected source in understanding Bergson’s 
philosophical matters of concern.
 A double turn has occurred in recent work which 
has brought philosophers back to Bergson, and by 
routes that could not have been anticipated. The 
increased attention paid to the work on ancient 
philosophy in Foucault and Deleuze, the engage-
ment with Lucretius, for example in the work of 
Serres, and the new thinking in the philosophy of 
science in Prigogine and Stengers, has reopened 
for consideration the very theoretical problems 
Bergson faced in his reading of Lucretius. This has 
led to a new awareness that Bergson’s relation to 
reading the philosophical past is not an historicist 
exercise but the very means by which he becomes, 
to use a later turn of phrase, the event of his own 
thinking.6
I would like to examine, in this short paper, the 
work of Henri Bergson on Lucretius, first published 
in 1884 under the title Extraits de Lucrèce, and 
argue for its significance in understanding the 
development of his philosophical thinking.1 This 
publication was intended to serve as an introduction 
to extracts from Lucretius for Bergson’s students 
at Clermont-Ferrand, and included a commentary 
and notes on the poetry, philosophy, physics and 
language of Lucretius’s poem De Rerum Natura.2 In 
the published volume, most of Bergson’s overview 
of Lucretius is given in the long preface, and this 
is followed by extracts in Latin without translation 
into French, but with comments on lines and indi-
vidual words covering all the books of the original 
poem. By 1899 it was in its third edition, and was 
still in print until the 1960s. Copies today are diffi-
cult to obtain, and only recently has a full electronic 
version become available on the Internet Archive, to 
which readers here are directly referred.3
 In the new edition of Henri Bergson’s Écrits 
philosophiques, edited by Worms, the Extraits have 
been omitted. The editorial decision may indicate 
that it is seen as work in ‘classics’ or a literary work, 
or that it is not ‘philosophical’, and is therefore not to 
be included in a new full critical edition of Bergson. 
Worms takes Time and Free Will as Bergson’s 
first philosophical work, and allows the inclusion 
of the French translation of the minor thesis Quid 
Aristoteles de loco senserit, as well as some essays. 
Yet in almost a thousand pages of this first ‘critical’ 
edition, he has made no reference whatsoever to 
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 Bergson begins by referring to the lack of knowl-
edge that surrounds such a famous name, as little is 
actually known about the life of Lucretius. He notes 
Jerome’s anecdote that Lucretius was probably born 
around 99-98 BCE, and in his early forties took, or 
was given, some kind of love potion and went mad 
and died, or committed suicide around 55 BCE This 
legend of the suicide of Lucretius may have been 
taken from the lost De Poetis by Suetonius, or it 
may have been invented to underline the connec-
tion between personal despair and lack of belief in 
God. In his Le Miel et l’Absinthe, Comte-Sponville, 
the only contemporary French author to comment in 
any detail or engage directly with Bergson’s inter-
pretation of Lucretius, spends some time on this 
anecdote from Jerome, and, in turn, notes the way 
in which Bergson has identified in his reading of 
the poem a curious paradox, namely that the most 
loyal disciple of Epicurus produced a work in which 
living is seen as a sad and discouraging burden; in 
short, a view of Lucretius as someone who lived a 
hidden life, following the Epicurean injunction, but 
as a resolute melancholic, and that a temperament 
of melancholy pervades the whole work.7
 A second suggestion from Bergson, also taken 
up by Comte-Sponville, is that Lucretius is largely 
unknown to us because he was a ‘dangerous 
friend’. It is for the most part idle to speculate, 
given the dearth of biographical sources, why this 
is mentioned by almost all ancient authors who cite 
and respond to Lucretius in significant detail, a good 
example being – as Hardie has shown – Virgil’s 
echo and retort to Lucretius in his Eclogues; and 
further, the presence of Lucretius in Horace and 
Ovid. It is Bergson’s view that these writers are 
loathe to invoke Lucretius personally due to the 
fashion for religious cults and public rituals which 
returned under Augustus, thus making Lucretius 
a ‘dangerous friend’ given his known rejection of 
religion.8 
 Bergson begins his consideration by also 
 Reflection on creation and the world leads him 
to philosophical problems and questions which, 
it can be argued, preoccupy him throughout his 
published work; in other words, it can be shown that 
the reading of Lucretius, the extracts made, and his 
notes and commentary, make it possible to read 
Creative Evolution, written almost fifty years later, as 
the return of earlier thinking, as the future of his own 
philosophy, which can then be seen as a philosophy 
of creation simpliciter. By a double turn, the later 
work helped make the earlier relevant again in a 
different and more urgent way, so that the reading 
of Lucretius is now seen as crucial for Bergson. It 
brings him to a cosmological understanding of a 
world which is free of stasis or of predicative geom-
etry – Euclidean – and allows him to think in terms 
of cosmogenesis and existence as a constant 
process of creation. Bergson’s engagement with 
classical atomism and atomistic theory moves him 
away from the dualisms of mind/matter, spirit/body 
and consciousness/unconsciousness, and towards 
thinking in terms of aspects and states of eternally 
shifting cosmic matter as ‘becoming’. It is also both 
a direct engagement with a materialist philosophy 
and a commitment to the philosophy of science and 
the study of ancient physics in the Atomists, and, 
later, Aristotle.
 The Extraits were intended to be an introduction 
to the work of Lucretius, a Latin poet whose teach-
ings were also the poetic rendering of someone 
who considered himself a disciple of Epicurus, a 
faithful disciple and author of the most significant 
philosophical poem in the Latin language, yet one 
who remains less known than any of those who 
drew on his work. Bergson remains a scrupulous 
reader, approaching his task, however, with a very 
specific aim, namely to talk about the philosophical 
import of the poem, and thus he deals with philolog-
ical matters only and in so far as his primary reading 
is affected. The book is laid out with a preface and 
introduction in which Bergson signals his procedure 
and hermeneutic position.
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Men seem to feel some burden on their soul,
Some heavy weariness. Could they but know
Its origin, its cause, they’d never live
The way we see most of them do, each one
Ignorant of what he wants, except a change.
In Lucretius’s bleak summary, each man flees 
himself, but as might be expected, the self whom 
he cannot escape clings to him, even more so and 
against his will, and he hates himself because he is 
sick and does not know the cause of his complaint. 
Or in the beautiful, compressed and pungent Latin 
of the poet:
hoc se quisque modo fugit (at quem scilicet, ut fit, 
effugere haut potis est, ingratius haeret) et odit 
propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger;
(Bk. III, 1068-1070)
(Each man flees from himself or tries, but the pest 
clings to him, even more ungraciously, He hates 
himself because he does not know the reason for his 
sickness.)
Lucretius offers a remedy, and it remains one of the 
most pointed declarations of his poem, in which, as 
will be argued later, the dualism of nature/reason 
is rejected. There is no disjunction but, instead, a 
thoroughgoing naturalism which is also a thorough-
going rationalism, and thus in Bk. II, 54-61:
omnis cum in tenebris praesertim via laboret.
nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
interdum, nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam
quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura.
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 
(Life is one long struggle in the dark,
Even as children shiver and fear things
in the blind darkness, trembling, so
pointing to the greater likelihood that Lucretius was 
living as a philosopher, and it is the theme of the 
philosophical life that is an important emphasis in 
Book II. But for Bergson, and this is very specific 
to his interpretation, the first and dominant impres-
sion of De Rerum Natura is that it is profoundly 
melancholic. The poem is sad and discouraging; it 
raises the question: why life? Life is monotonous 
and always exhibits unsatisfied desire, its pleasures 
are deceiving, it lacks animal joy, and every source 
of delight is mixed with bitterness. A baby cries on 
entering the world, and Bergson remarks that this is 
the correct response. The passage from Lucretius 
at V, 222-227, suggests a sense of life that is given 
without choice: the individual comes in a world 
into which he or she has been literally thrown or 
regurgitated. 
 The tone of melancholy is further strengthened 
by additional observations in which no false comfort 
is afforded to anyone, including the belief that living 
in the countryside would somewhat ameliorate the 
condition of dwelling in the city. This is an illusion, 
even the rusticated life is full of hardship and toil, 
and the earth resists the cultivation of vain happi-
ness. Then, of course, there is also old age and the 
omnipresent, childish fear of death. Thus everything 
is misère here below, and our greatest consolation is 
that everything finishes with us when our life is over 
(Extracts, p. III). This is the most explicit teaching 
Bergson finds in Lucretius, and the conclusion of all 
philosophy, which literally demands of us a ridding 
of illusions and an acceptance of the fatal destiny of 
being born and dying.
 For Lucretius, the absence of any illusion is the 
way of enlightenment, but again it has a power and 
rapture which goes beyond the calmness and tran-
quillity of soul that Epicurus speaks of. The most 
powerful lines in which mankind’s existential situa-
tion is described can be found at the end of Bk. III, 
1046-1094: 
32
attaches, as well as to the predictability of the fatal 
consequences of such causality – that the laws of 
nature can be mathematically predicted – and this 
for Bergson is the ideé mâitresse of the poem. This 
‘fatality’ is what Bergson identifies as the certus of 
which Lucretius speaks in Bk. V, 920.
 The whole poem exhibits for Bergson a preoccu-
pation with this same idea, ‘celle de la fixité des lois 
de la nature’ (Extraits, p. VIII). Nothing explains the 
suffusion of melancholic insight more than brooding 
on such a double reality, and nothing requires more 
pitié – genuine compassion – than the realisation 
that humanity is just a plaything of forces: it comes 
into existence through the accident of a poor combi-
nation of atoms that fatal laws join for a time and 
one day disperse. Rather than the idea of birth and 
dying, there is the actual fact of appearing and disap-
pearing again, from and into the material of atoms. 
This passage is not epiphenomenal, since Bergson 
does not posit any doctrine of two worlds, but rather 
posits a double which is in unity, the unity of what 
is held, retained, maintained, as physically existent. 
The flux and the fixity are both held together in 
the tension of a mobile image which is in constant 
motion. This can be seen as a dynamic monism, in 
that the holding together is the co-equivalence, or 
the active mutual interpretation and exchange that 
is taken as the reflexive and recursive power, or the 
dynamism of the existent.
 We are deluded if we think that matter is made 
for us, and from Lucretius’s advice to labourers in 
Bk. II, 1142, one sees that the consolation is simply 
to know that we are subject to fatal laws and that the 
world is on the way to ruin. Hence there is really no 
particular praise or blame in an act of suicide. These 
are the truths that Lucretius will bring to the Romans, 
whose eminent practical nature was taken up with 
establishing long solutions to satisfy conservative 
aims through aggressive means. Jerome’s anec-
dote recounting that Lucretius was a member of 
the equestrian order rings true and may explain the 
we, in the light, shudder at things not less
awful than what babies fear, and the horror
they imagine that is on its way.
Our terrors and gloom of mind
must be dispelled not by the sun’s rays or shafts of light,
but by the aspect and law of nature.)
The last line may also be paraphrased as ‘insight 
into nature and systematic reflection’. Furthermore, 
the role of knowledge is to remind us that we hardly 
count in the order of the universe, we are just an 
accidental combination of elements with whom the 
‘gods’ are not in the least concerned, and we die 
and decompose like other living matter.
 Bergson raises the question, having identified the 
overwhelming mood, as to where this melancholy 
comes from. He points to the civil strife of the late 
Republic, the rivalry of Marius and Sulla, which is 
indicated in the opening verse, and their prayer for 
peace. The civil war left sombre images in the mind 
of Lucretius, but that is nevertheless neither the real 
source of the melancholy, nor the main subject of 
the poem. If he did write in the light of such events, 
Lucretius would have considered knowledge a pis-
aller, or a simple means of consolation (Extraits, IV). 
Rather, it was for Lucretius the object of human life, 
and public disasters are real ills because they tear 
intelligence away from the only noble pursuit and 
occupation worthy of it.
 It is at this point in his reflections that Bergson 
identifies the first great ‘double’ of his analysis: the 
variety and diversity of nature, its contingency, and 
yet its obedience to fixed laws. Lucretius has made 
the same double in the relationship between nature 
and reason. It is clear from Bk. V that Lucretius 
loved nature passionately, exemplified by his minute 
observations, and that he saw a range of infinitely 
diverse and changing phenomena yet believed that a 
fixed law worked uniformly and invariably, producing 
determined effects. It is to this dual phenomenon of 
variety and fixity that the melancholy of Lucretius 
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thoughts are moving atoms, and this is a remarkable 
event of speed. There never has been, and there 
never will be anything but atoms, the void, and move-
ment (Extraits, p. XIII).9
The second source of thinking with which Lucretius 
engages is that of Epicurus. Bergson is again pithy 
in his characterisation of the aims of the philosophy 
of Epicurus, namely that it seeks to secure happi-
ness by the shortest route. The aim is how to 
secure inner peace and inalterable security in the 
present. What impedes such a goal is twofold: the 
fear of Gods and the fear of death. What counters 
this double superstition and fundamental source of 
religion, which poisons life and profoundly corrupts 
us, is the claim that the gods are not bothered with 
us – which does not, of course, necessarily say 
they do not exist – and that death is not the end. 
Epicurus has the role of one who brings enlighten-
ment, and he does this with the doctrine of atomism. 
By showing, as Democritus had, that there are only 
atoms in the world, and by showing the natural 
chain of causes, superstition is overcome and the 
fear of death also vanishes.10
 Bergson, then, rather than dealing with the 
complex series of arguments advanced by Aristotle 
against movement in the void, or how it can be 
explained that atoms have directionality etcetera, 
points only to the important direct contention of 
Epicurus, suggesting that Epicurus gave weight to 
atoms, which therefore fell from above to below. 
Bergson may be drawing directly on the work of 
Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy, which his 
teacher Boutroux had introduced to students at the 
École Normale Supérieure. Zeller maintained that 
Democritus has also argued for the weight of atoms, 
which goes against Aristotle at Metaphysics, I. 4, 
and the reports of Plutarch in Stobaeus, but Zeller 
further adds that if Democritus did ascribe weight, 
he didn’t think of it as the cause of movement.
 The Epicureans contend that one can show the 
subtle linguistic echoes of Ennius and occasional 
archaic preferences in the choice of vocabulary in 
the poem. In his own life as a poet and philosopher, 
Lucretius enacts the tensions held as one, even if 
they are mutually seen as opposites, contradictory, 
or polar. He makes no claim to be a sage, and thus 
his struggles and moods are presented equally with 
his intense observation and analysis of previous 
thinkers whom he admires. 
 Bergson then points out that Lucretius could not 
have advanced such thinking without his fidelity to 
the thoughts of Epicurus, and yet at the same time 
he displays originality. This is one of the enigmas of 
discipleship. The originality of Lucretius comes from 
his fidelity to Epicurus and Democritus. Bergson 
then posits his teaching as faithful to the real 
sources of Epicurus, namely the atomists, and that 
atomism was one of the most profound systems of 
philosophy in antiquity, founded by Leucippus and 
his disciple Democritus. Virgil’s fidelity to Homer is 
similar in its eventuating in an original achievement. 
 Broadening this perspective, we still have the 
poet and his concerns. Bergson invites his students 
to consider this claim by remarking on some meth-
odological features of the system, as found in 
Democritus, namely its overwhelming simplicity, 
and how this is the true characteristic of the best 
explanation: the reduction of complexity to simple 
elements, and, in this case, the elements which 
form material objects are atoms. Bergson reads 
the question of the doctrine of the atomists largely 
via Democritus, which he sees as its most perfect 
expression, and which he identifies as ‘l’expression 
la plus parfaite peut-être du matérialisme’.
Atoms are indivisible, infinite in number and eternal, 
they have no other quality but form, and this is how 
they differ. Since atoms are eternal and do not change, 
it is form that differs. Atoms are endowed with move-
ment and even the soul is composed of atoms, which 
are very round, mobile and polished. Indeed, one’s 
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his view on religion. He refers to the conquest of 
Epicurus, who returns with the knowledge of what 
can come into being and what cannot, or, in sum, 
how each thing has its powers defined and its deep-
set boundary marked:
Thus his force
His vital force of mind…
With wit and wisdom came back to us
Bringing news of what can be
And what cannot, limits and boundaries,
The borderline, the benchmark, set forever.
For Bergson, this indicates that a determinate cause 
can only produce a determinate effect. That is the 
principle of every version of materialism.
 Bergson also keeps repeating and underlining 
the attack by Lucretius on religion that includes 
superstition,11 where again, false beliefs about the 
origin of the soul and its destiny are seen as the 
main sources. He draws freely on contemporary 
scholarship to advance his view, thus the sources 
of Lucretius are listed in Siemerin’s Quaestionum 
Lucretianarum (Koeningsberg, 1867). He draws 
attention to Lucretius’s complex vocabulary and 
inventive punning, referring to Schubert’s De 
Lucretiana verborum formatione (Halle, 1805). In 
his reading of line 150, Bergson focuses on what he 
takes to be the general principle of the system – that 
nothing comes from nothing, that nothing is annihi-
lated – ‘nullam rem e nilo gigni divinitus umquam’, 
which may be rendered as: ‘no thing is ever 
produced through divine power from nothing’. He 
sees this as a translation of the phrase attributed to 
Epicurus: ‘ouden gignetai ex tou me ontos pan ek 
pantos’, where he is probably drawing on Diogenes 
Laertius at Bk. X, 38.
 De Rerum Natura is pre-eminently a poem on 
physics. Physics is naturalism because nature is all 
that there is, and this distinction between science 
and the whole of things resonates most clearly in 
movement of atoms in a void, and respond to the 
question of how, if they fall at the same speed, they 
can meet. This is done by introducing the notion 
of kinesis kata pareklision, and what is called the 
clinamen, which is the fundamental character of 
deviation and cannot be predicted. It is, as Bergson 
says, ‘un caprice d’atome’. The clinamen is a capri-
cious and contingent collision (Extraits, p.XVI). 
 It is thus that one explains the formation of worlds 
and one can speak of cosmogenesis, which moves 
from upper to lower and lower to upper simultane-
ously, giving rise to turbulence, or more correctly, 
rotation. Such a scheme posited infinite worlds 
different from each other, and new worlds that are 
always being created: there is no need for an intelli-
gent cause for our world; everything is explained by 
the laws of matter. All possible combinations arise 
from an infinity of atomic movement; we see what 
we take to be best for survival and then designate it 
as admirable order. 
 In Bergson’s annotations to the lines of Bk. I and 
II of Lucretius, one can follow in specific and very 
precise detail how he makes the differential reading 
between Lucretius, Epicurus and Democritus 
possible. It is also in Bergson’s comments on these 
selected sections that one is presented with what 
he takes to be the essential philosophy of Lucretius, 
and how he maintains his principle of interpreting 
the philosopher from his own words and not via the 
remarks of later thinkers, although this becomes 
an impossible task since even the surviving manu-
scripts of the ‘copyists’ are part of the received 
history and not free of interpretative consequences. 
Such a commitment does not preclude Bergson 
from adding corrections and critical points to the 
material on which he is commenting. There is no 
neutral commentator: that is a fiction of exegetical 
fanaticism. For example, Bergson corrects Lucretius 
in line 66 of the first book by noting that Epicurus 
was not the primum homo against the gods, and 
mentions the banning from Athens of Protagoras for 
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The principle of principles, if one can so put it, is 
clearly that nothing can come from nothing. The 
implication of this principle is that nothing can begin. 
In an absolute sense, something always derives 
from something else. The task of the first two books 
is to talk about the ‘everything’, and that everything 
is nature, to pan or summarum summa. By talking 
about the nature of things one is only talking about 
nature, as there is nothing other than particular 
material existents and what happens to them, things 
and events ‘are’ nature. The poem’s overriding aim 
is to establish that there is nothing but nature; there 
is no transcendental or supernatural realm. The 
naturae species ratioque can also be rendered as 
the ‘sufficient reason of things’ as Leibniz does, but 
it refers to the rational unity of the whole as that 
which exists literally in a bulk or tenuous physical 
sense. 
 The notion of materialism – which is not a 
term from antiquity but from the seventeenth 
century – thus returns to pre-Socratic philosophy, 
in that it cannot entrain the notion of an intelli-
gible realm of ideas or forms that is ‘no-where’. 
This refuses the irrational for nature, it refuses the 
supernatural, and it refuses a transcendental realm. 
There is only nature, and this nature is not itself a 
thing; it is aleatory, and infinite of all things and all 
events.
 There are further consequences that derive from 
the principle of nothing coming from nothing, which 
distinguishes the ‘corporalism’ of the Stoics from a 
radical version of atomism, and thus a materialism 
in which thought and extension are not separated, 
where thoughts and movement and speed of 
thinking are atomistic in the way of all other existent 
beings. What is radical is that one must not only 
abandon the lures of transcendence and the super-
natural, of gods and of religion, but also the notion 
that nature is some kind of living being; in other 
words, the lures of vitalism, finalism or pantheism. 
Life, according to Lucretius and his interpretation of 
Greek. Phusis, from which physics is derived, like 
the word natura in Latin, is related to what is coming 
into existence, birthing – natura from nascor, and 
phusis meaning ‘what grows’. Lucretius empha-
sises that his study is of the ‘things’ of nature. The 
desire of the poet, who is also writing a kind of tragic 
version of his own teacher’s doctrine, is to write on 
everything that is: ‘omne quod est’ (Bk. I, 958). 
Lucretius had set out his programme, to write on the 
scheme of things and to set out an account of the 
powers above and the origin of things: ‘the seeds 
from which nature creates all things’, how they 
increase and multiply, and how they are resolved 
into their elements after they have run their course. 
These ‘things’ are called matter, the life-motes, or 
the seeds of things; or, since a name is needed for 
them, they could be called ‘firstlings’, since every-
thing follows from these beginnings: 
Nam tibi de summa caeli ratione deumque
disserere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam
unde omnis natura creet res auctet alatque
quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat,
quae nos materiem et genitalia corpora rebus
reddunda in ratione vocare et semina rerum
appellare suëmus et haec eadem usurpare
corpora prima, quod ex illis sunt omnia primis.
(Bk. I, 55-61)
In Rolfe Humphries’ version:
… I shall begin
With a discussion of the scheme of things
As it regards the heaven and powers above,
Then I shall state the origin of things,
The seeds from which nature creates all things,
Bids them increase and multiply; in turn,
How she resolves them to their elements
After their course is run. These things we call 
Matter, the life-motes, or seeds of things,
(If we must find, in schools, a name for them),
Firstlings, we well might say, since every thing 
Follows from these beginnings.
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 For Bergson, it is only by grasping what the 
primordial things are that one can comprehend 
that it is because they are atoms that sound and 
heat result from their simple vibrations, which can 
ultimately be taken as a universal vibration, like 
the tremor on a spider’s web, where everything is 
dynamically interconnected and in communication. 
Bergson disposes of any difficulties with regard 
to indivisible, tasteless, odourless atoms (a kind 
of negative physics where one can only say what 
atoms are not) by indicating that it is the cause of 
the sensation that is material, not the sensation 
itself. Causality is material. 
 In considering the problem of the void and the 
weight of atoms, Bergson shows that in Lucretius, 
the real distinction is on what can be touched or 
what cannot be touched. In the final analysis, then, 
a body is the simple property of atoms or groups 
of atoms. Thus for Lucretius all reality is material. 
There are bodies and there is void. This gives to 
Lucretius a double, per se existent ontology.
 We may ask with what and how we can charac-
terise Bergson’s emphasis and interpretations with 
regard to Lucretius and atomism, and also the prob-
lems it created for his own research in the following 
years as he worked on a minor and major thesis for 
his doctorate at the Sorbonne.12
 I offer the following as a somewhat truncated 
and elliptical conclusion, given that almost all the 
detailed discussion of Bergson’s work on ancient 
philosophy at this time, especially his work on 
Leibniz, needs to be fully reconsidered in the light of 
newly available material published since 2010. The 
point can be made that Bergson sees in the work 
on Lucretius an achievement within ancient philos-
ophy that allows a double without dualism, and a 
resolution to what had been taken as the cleavage 
between, for example, a philosophy of becoming 
and a philosophy of being, which is characterised 
as a fundamental divide. 
Epicurus, is an ‘accident’ of inanimate nature.
 Lucretius establishes that nothing can arise from 
nothing, but that everything comes from a particular 
something, and for a reason, and out of specific 
material elements. The very evidence of growth, the 
coming into being, the birthing of things, disproves 
the possibility of the contrary being true, and again 
throughout lines 151-158 and 188-198 of Bk. I, 
Lucretius makes use of paradox and logical refuta-
tion to establish his leading principle. The various 
invocations to Venus and Voluptas set against Mars 
and strife do not mask the fact that they are also 
joined according to mythic tales. Lucretius stresses 
the idea of generative and dynamic becoming – that 
from which things start – as an event, due to its 
temporal character. Only the atoms and the void 
retain an immutable character, and from the inani-
mate come the whole seed, breed and generation 
of things and human history. Atoms and the void are 
eternal, and this differs from our notion of physics. 
It is here that Bergson finds the most sensitive 
point with regard to his own release from Herbert 
Spenser’s impact on his thinking at the École 
Normale Supérieure: how to hold within the concept 
of an eternal void and the eternity of atoms, a non-
mechanistic explanation of what is patently visible 
regarding change and movement. Lucretius sets it 
out tersely:
ergo si solida ac sine inani corpora prima
sunt ita uti docui, sint haec aeterna necessest
(Bk I, 537-39)
(If, as I have taught, the first bodies
are solid and without void, they must be everlasting)
 
Part of the greatest difficulty is distinguishing how 
Lucretius differs and separates himself from Stoical 
notions of the corporeal, and, ultimately, from the 
divinity attributed by the Stoics to the cosmos and 
stars. 
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inevitably echoes the subversion which Democritus 
makes of the Parmenidean One, since here, it is not 
that ‘being’ can be said in many ways, but rather 
it multiplies, or, more accurately, it is multiple –
even infinitely multiple. Monism and pluralism are 
one and the same. As Comte-Sponville remarks: 
‘Tel est le coup de force, ou le coup de génie, de 
l’atomisme.’13
What Bk. II broaches is the dynamic and cine-
matic movement of atoms, which is perpetual and 
sempiternal, without beginning or end. The succinct 
argument can be found at lines 83-102 of that 
section. The truth of being is movement not rest, 
and the analogy of the dust-motes, which can also 
be found in Democritus and Aristotle, helps one 
picture the situation (lines 114-122). To closely para-
phrase: ‘where one is said to see dancing motes 
or dust beams, as the sun streams into shuttered 
rooms, yes, like a little army in manoeuvre, with 
squadrons charging, retreating, joining, parting’. 
From this one can infer that on a nanoscale, there 
is similar turbulence and/or whirling. And there is 
more to say: these dust particles tell us that there 
is motion in what seems solid and durable, and 
this restlessness, which one sees in their coming 
and going every which way, indicates the inner 
atomic restlessness, at first moved by its own inner 
impulses. Motion comes from first beginnings and 
grows until we can see the process just as we see 
dancing motes in sunlight.
 However, we cannot see the ‘urge’ that pushes 
this, nor really appreciate the speed. Again, only 
analogy can help, and analogy already presup-
poses too much understanding. There is no first 
mover, the weight and shocks of atoms themselves 
constitute dynamic and movement; ‘above’ and 
‘below’ are not in relation to a place, but a direc-
tion, and the explanation given is the clinamen. 
The whole of the difficult section of Bk. II can be 
cited from lines 217-93, and the complexity of the 
arguments requires, and happily has, a meticulous 
 Indeed, the expression of a radical materialism 
is to say that there are innumerable bodies in an 
infinite void and nothing else. Values and thinking 
exist as secondary activities caused by us, and 
these values and thoughts are determined not 
by the body, but by the situation of physics itself; 
the situation of natura is that it does not think or 
have value. Value and consciousness are created 
because we ‘live’, which acknowledges our emer-
gence from the structure of what is inanimate and 
based on complexity and hazard. 
 There is no reduction to the elements since 
they are not alive. The matter/void double retains 
its identity even in emergence, because it is clear 
that atoms have no secondary qualities, they are 
without smell, taste, noise, temperature, and they 
are without sensitive life or spirit; they have only 
a form, a mass, a force which moves them and a 
movement. They are infinite. The universe is thus 
infinite. Being infinite, atoms have neither a centre 
nor a limit, which is the source of ‘freedom’ for 
nature. Atoms are without any subject or end that 
could govern them, and the freedom of nature is that 
it is, to conclude, summarum summa. If gods exist 
they form part of this ‘all’, but they cannot govern its 
destiny. 
 But nature cannot create, as we think to do with 
our human inventions. In Bk. II, 292-293, the conse-
quences of the situation of the atom/void disjunction 
remains free because it has neither end nor subject, 
and what prevents the mind from being necessary 
within it, even as a secondary emergence from 
the infinite of atoms and void, is that the mind is 
not mastered or forced to endure because of the 
‘minute swerving of the first beginnings at no fixed 
place and at no fixed time’. 
id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum
nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. 
This is a unique usage of clinamen in Latin, and it 
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scientists, a matter which has only recently been 
discussed in Professor Daniel Brown’s 2013 
Cambridge publication, The Poetry of Victorian 
Scientists, where again one sees a reading of 
Lucretius that moves in the same direction as that 
adduced by Bergson. Moreover, Brown argues that 
in the work of the scientist Maxwell, and in Deleuze’s 
reflections, there is a response to Lucretius that 
recognises a dynamic pluralism in thought and 
nature which does not surrender them to entropic 
randomness and meaningless empty nonsense. 
Notes
1. Henri Bergson, Extraits de Lucrèce (Paris: Delagrave, 
1884). 
2. For the English citations of Lucretius I have for the 
most part used the translations of W.H.D. Rouse in: 
Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (London: Heinemann, 
1953). 
3. <http://archive.org/details/extraitsdelucr00lucr> 
[accessed 07 April 2014]. For biographical information 
on this period of Bergson’s life in France, see Philippe 
Soulez and Frédéric Worms, Bergson (Paris: PUF, 
2002), cf. pp. 49-50 for comments on the Extraits.
4. Écrits philosophiques (Paris: PUF, 2011). Here, 
general principles of the edition are discussed at 
pp. 11-15.
5. The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, ed. by Stuart 
Gillespie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).
6. The substantial Rezeptionsgeschichte on Bergson 
in the Cambridge Companion traces philosophical 
responses up to the current period, but ignores de 
facto the important and persistent French work in 
the publications of Deleuze, Foucault, Serres, Bruno 
Latour and, most recently, Badiou. For this, one should 
turn to Jonathan Goldberg, The Seed of Things (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2009). Goldberg’s 
main interest is the reading of Lucretius in Foucault 
and Deleuze. He has taken little account of the work 
of Marcel Conche and André Comte-Sponville, and 
the note on Bergson is cursory; however, it is still a 
commentary by Don Fowler, cited above at note 8. 
 What is one to make of the deviation, the paren-
klisis? Does it introduce chance and chaos as the 
source of the multiple or is the multiple directed, 
as if by a kind of spiritual ‘free will’, through such a 
deviation? One can, it seems, view the clinamen as 
the power of the event, which the eternity of atoms 
could not produce themselves. In one sense, the 
swerve is anti-fatalist; it is that which creates the 
possibility of the event arriving, something new that 
comes into time as a present. It arrives; it is where 
the eternal present of nature makes time as event. 
 The notion that a causality must take place 
somewhere, in a linear way, is not required by the 
theory of the void and matter. In a logical sense, it is 
the clinamen that gives the eruption of the new as 
time and place. We can speak of a discontinuous 
causality, because the swerve allows the event 
of time. This is the primacy of the actual over the 
virtual, since it is the event which makes time. The 
clinamen is an atemporal condition of time, and 
it allows beginning without itself having a starting 
point. Because of its relation to the indetermination 
of the atoms/void, it breaks the chain of succession, 
and necessity must then act in time, which breaks 
its absolute power of determination. This is how 
necessity becomes simultaneously multiplied and 
partialised by the constraint of the infinite accord-
ance with the order of time. The clinamen is a 
permanent power of the accidental, which ruptures 
necessity as it temporalises the eternal present of 
matter/void as the event. By its own perpetual crea-
tion of the new, instant by instant, nature is natura 
creatrix, and this takes place ipsa sua per se sponte; 
that is to say, spontaneously and from itself. There 
are no gods, no constraints, no impositions. Nature 
is ‘free’.14
 One concluding remark is in order, namely to 
point out how close Bergson’s concerns in this work 
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